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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Appellant, Robert G. Eyer, appeals from an order entered 
on April 11, 1996, denying his motion filed pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2255 ("section 2255"). On February 13, 1990, a 
grand jury returned a one-count indictment charging Eyer 
with using and carrying a firearm in relation to a drug 
trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) 
("section 924(c)(1)"). Eyer waived trial by jury, and was 
convicted at a bench trial on May 21, 1990. On August 10, 
1990, the district court sentenced Eyer to a five-year 
custodial term followed by a three-year term of supervised 
release to be served consecutively to any sentence he then 
was serving. 
 
On February 28, 1996, Eyer, through an attorney,filed a 
motion under section 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct 
his sentence. The motion included a brief contending that 
in Bailey v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 501 (1995), the 
Supreme Court held that a defendant cannot be convicted 
of a violation of section 924(c)(1) unless he "actively 
employs the firearm in connection with the drug trafficking 
offense." The brief further asserted that "active 
employment" includes "brandishing, displaying, bartering, 
striking with, firing, attempting to fire, or referencing the 
firearm" but does not "include possession of a firearm at or 
near the site of a drug crime, storing a weapon near drug 
proceeds, or concealing a firearm nearby to be ready for 
imminent confrontation." 
 
The brief quoted the presentence report which explained 
that a person cooperating with a drug task force placed an 
order with Eyer for an ounce of cocaine to be delivered to 
the purchaser's apartment. When Eyer arrived with the 
cocaine the officers arrested him and seized the automobile 
in which he was making the delivery. The officers then 
obtained a search warrant and searched the vehicle, finding 
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a fully loaded Colt .380 caliber semi-automatic hand gun 
with a live round in its chamber located in the console 
between its front seats along with some cocaine. 
Notwithstanding the location of the firearm, in his motion 
Eyer claimed that there was "no evidence that[he] actively 
employed the handgun." Thus, in his view, the 
government's proof could not support the conviction under 
section 924(c)(1) as construed in Bailey. Accordingly, Eyer 
requested that the district court vacate his conviction and 
sentence. 
 
After the parties filed further pleadings, the district court, 
without holding a hearing, ruled on the section 2255 
motion in a memorandum accompanying the order of April 
11, 1996. The court pointed out that Bailey applied only to 
the "using" prong of section 924(c)(1) which speaks of a 
defendant who, in the disjunctive, "uses or carries a 
firearm" in relation to any crime of violence or drug 
trafficking crime. The court then held that Eyer was 
carrying the gun because he was transporting it by vehicle. 
The court cited several cases in support of this holding 
including United States v. Pineda-Ortuno, 952 F.2d 98, 103- 
04 (5th Cir. 1992), and United States v. Freisinger, 937 F.2d 
383, 387-88 (8th Cir. 1991). Based on these conclusions, 
the district court denied the motion. 
 
Eyer then appealed to this court and sought a certificate 
of appealability from both the district court and this court. 
On July 1, 1996, the district court granted a certificate of 
appealability. Its order, however, does not specify the issue 
or issues warranting granting the certificate 
notwithstanding that 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3) ("section 
2253(c)(3)") requires a certificate of appealability under 28 
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) ("section 2253(c)(1)") to indicate the 
issues justifying its issuance. This court has not acted on 
Eyer's application to it for the certificate of appealability. 
The parties have briefed the case both on the procedural 
issues and on the merits and have argued orally. We 
exercise plenary review. 
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II. DISCUSSION 
 
a. Procedural issues 
 
The first issue is whether the district court properly 
issued the certificate of appealability. The government 
contends that the district court could not do so because 
only a circuit justice or a circuit judge can issue a 
certificate of appealability. Thus, the government argues 
that unless we issue a certificate of appealability, we cannot 
decide this case on the merits. 
 
Until the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
110 Stat. 1214 (1996), effective April 24, 1996, a petitioner 
in federal custody who was denied relief by a district court 
on a section 2255 motion could appeal to a court of appeals 
without obtaining a certificate of probable cause. By 
contrast, a petitioner challenging detention arising out of 
process issued by a state court could not appeal "unless 
the justice or judge who rendered the order or a circuit 
justice or judge issue[d] a certificate of probable cause." 28 
U.S.C. § 2253 ("section 2253"). The AEDPA changed these 
procedures; in particular the Act replaced certificates of 
probable cause with certificates of appealability and 
required prisoners in federal custody to obtain a certificate 
of appealability to appeal from the denial of relief under 
section 2255. 
 
Unfortunately, the AEDPA created an ambiguity with 
respect to the designation of the judges who can issue 
certificates of appealability. It amended section 2253 in 
pertinent part to read as follows: 
 
(c)(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a 
certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken 
from -- 
 
 (A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in 
which the detention complained of arises out of process 
issued by a State court; or 
 
 (B) the final order in a proceeding under section 
2255. 
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When Congress enacted the AEDPA it deleted from section 
2253 the provision that the "judge who rendered the order" 
could issue a certificate of probable cause, and thus there 
is no provision in section 2253, as amended by the AEDPA, 
providing that the judge who rendered the order may issue 
a certificate of appealability. This deletion casts doubt on 
the power of a district judge to issue a certificate of 
appealability, especially inasmuch as the reference in 
section 2253 prior to its amendment by the AEDPA to 
"circuit justice or judge" arguably meant "circuit justice" or 
"circuit judge." After all, the "judge who entered the order" 
ordinarily would have been a district judge and thus it 
would not have been necessary to read "judge" in "circuit 
justice or judge" to include district judges in order to 
authorize a judge denying the order to issue a certificate of 
probable cause. Accordingly, the government reasonably 
argues that the district court did not have the authority to 
issue the certificate of appealability to Eyer. 
 
We reject the government's argument. Certainly the term 
"circuit justice or judge" is ambiguous as "circuit" might 
modify only the word "justice" or might modify both 
"justice" and "judge." Obviously, if "circuit" applies to 
"judge" then only a court of appeals judge or circuit justice 
can issue a certificate of appealability. We might reject this 
application of "circuit" to "judge" on the ground that 
"circuit" as applied to "justice" refers to the allocation of the 
Supreme Court justices to the various circuits pursuant to 
an order of the Supreme Court as authorized in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 42. Under this reasoning, "circuit" as applied to "justice" 
refers to a judicial assignment and "circuit" should not be 
read to modify the word "judge" and thus be given a 
different meaning and refer to judges on the basis of their 
appointment, which in this case is to a court of appeals. 
 
In the final analysis, however, we conclude on a different 
basis that a district judge can issue a certificate of 
appealability. In section 2253(c)(1), as amended by the 
AEDPA, the language that an appeal may not be taken 
unless a "circuit justice or judge" issues a certificate of 
appealability is followed by the two subparagraphs, which 
we quoted above: subparagraph A, relating to custody 
arising out of process by a state court, and subparagraph 
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B, relating to proceedings involving federal prisoners under 
section 2255. These paragraphs appear in section 
2253(c)(1) in the disjunctive. This configuration makes it 
difficult, if not impossible, to construe section 2253(c)(1) so 
that "circuit justice or judge" has a different meaning in the 
two subparagraphs. Yet we know that, unless we are willing 
to hold that Congress made an extraordinary mistake in 
drafting, a district judge must be able to issue a certificate 
of appealability in a case arising under subparagraph A. 
 
This conclusion cannot be avoided because the AEDPA 
amended Fed. R. App. P. 22(b) to read in part as follows: 
 
Certificate of Appealability. - In a habeas corpus 
proceeding in which the detention complained of arises 
out of process issued by a State court, an appeal by 
the applicant for the writ may not proceed unless a 
district or a circuit judge issues a certificate of 
appealability pursuant to section 2253(c) of title 28, 
United States Code. If an appeal is taken by the 
applicant, the district judge who rendered the 
judgment shall either issue a certificate of appealability 
or state the reasons why such a certificate should not 
issue. 
 
Thus, at the very time that Congress amended section 2253 
to remove the language providing that the "judge who 
rendered the order" could issue a certificate of probable 
cause, now a certificate of appealability, it provided in Rule 
22(b) that a district judge in general, and the judge who 
rendered the judgment in particular, ordinarily, of course, 
a district judge, could issue a certificate of appealability. 
Furthermore, the AEDPA amendment to Rule 22(b) referred 
to section 2253(c) even though prior to the amendment 
Rule 22(b) did not mention section 2253 which at that time 
did not even have subsections. We also note that the 
amendment to Rule 22(b) appears conspicuously in Title I 
of the AEDPA, a short title dealing with habeas corpus 
reform. 
 
In these circumstances, we must conclude that Congress 
deliberately amended Rule 22(b); we consequently hold that 
section 2253(c)(1) authorizes a district judge to issue a 
certificate of appealability in cases under subparagraph A 
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and thus necessarily under subparagraph B as well. Our 
conclusion harmonizes Rule 22(b) and section 2253(c)(1), 
and thus we reject any suggestion that these provisions are 
inconsistent. Moreover, it would be strange to read section 
2253(c)(1) to authorize district judges to issue certificates of 
appealability in state but not in federal cases involving 
custody of prisoners. If anything, one might expect that 
Congress, for reasons of comity, would be more restrictive 
in vesting the power to issue a certificate of appealability in 
district judges in state rather than federal cases.1 
 
We have reached our determination through our own 
analysis. Nevertheless, we find it significant that other 
courts of appeals have reached the same result, though 
their reasoning may differ from ours. See Lozada v. United 
States, 107 F.3d 1011, 1016 (2d Cir. 1997) ("We therefore 
uphold the authority of district judges to issue COAs, at 
least in section 2254 cases."); United States v. Asrar, 108 
F.3d 217, 218 (9th Cir. 1997); Lyons v. Ohio Adult Parole 
Auth., 105 F.3d 1063, 1066-73 (6th Cir. 1997), petition for 
cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3648 (U.S. Mar. 14, 1997) (No. 96- 
1461); Hunter v. United States, 101 F.3d 1565, 1573-77 
(11th Cir. 1996) (en banc), petition for cert . filed, 65 
U.S.L.W. 3648 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1997) (No. 96-1443). 
 
Although we hold that the district court had the power to 
grant a certificate of appealability, we face additional 
procedural obstacles prior to deciding this appeal on the 
merits. First, the certificate of appealability in this case 
does not specify the issues that warrant its issuance as 
required by section 2253(c)(3). In an appropriate case, such 
an omission could lead us to remand the case for the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We agree with the Sixth Circuit that interpreting "circuit" as modifying 
only "justice" and not "judge" is a somewhat "tortured interpretation, but 
a possible one." Lyons v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 105 F.3d 1063, 1070 
(6th Cir. 1997), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3648 (U.S. Mar. 14, 
1997) (No. 96-1461). However, this interpretation provides the only 
plausible means of harmonizing section 2253(c)(1) and Fed. R. App. P. 
22(b). Harmonization seems particularly appropriate here, since it 
appears that the arguably inconsistent language of these two provisions 
was not adopted inadvertently. See Hunter v. United States, 101 F.3d 
1565, 1581-82 (11th Cir. 1996) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, 65 
U.S.L.W. 3648 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1997) (No. 96-1443). 
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district court to specify the issues. But we will not do so 
here for two reasons. First, because there was only one 
issue before the district court, the issue it determined 
warranted the issuance of the certificate is obvious. Second, 
at oral argument the government stated that if we 
concluded that the district court had the power to issue the 
certificate, we should decide the case on the merits without 
remanding the case to the district court. 
 
The second procedural obstacle we face prior to reaching 
the merits of the appeal is more serious. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2253(c)(2) ("section 2253(c)(2)") provides that a certificate 
of appealability can issue "only if the applicant has made a 
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 
Yet Eyer raises questions under Bailey involving issues of 
statutory construction. Therefore, it is possible that Eyer 
does not raise an issue involving a constitutional right. See 
Hohn v. United States, 99 F.3d 892 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 
Here, too, we avoid the procedural point because the 
government, though contending that we should not issue a 
certificate of appealability, does not contend that if we 
construe section 2253(c)(1) to authorize district courts to 
issue certificates of appealability, we should dismiss the 
appeal on the ground that Eyer does not raise an issue 
involving a constitutional right. Rather, at oral argument 
the government took the position that if the district court is 
empowered to issue certificates of appealability under 
section 2253(c)(1), we should decide this case on the 
merits. Thus, the determination of the meaning of 
"constitutional right" in section 2253(c)(2) is not necessary 
to the disposition of this appeal. 
 
In reaching our result, we have not disregarded our 
practice of examining our jurisdiction before reaching the 
merits of an appeal, and we recognize the possibility that 
the procedural problems we have identified could be 
considered jurisdictional. Instead, we are applying the 
settled principle "that an appellate court, confronted by a 
difficult jurisdictional or quasi-jurisdictional question, may 
forego its resolution if the merits of the appeal are, as here, 
straightforward and easily resolved in favor of the party or 
parties to whose benefit the objection to jurisdiction would 
redound." In re DN Assocs., 3 F.3d 512, 515 (1st Cir. 1993). 
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See also Switlik v. Hardwicke Co., 651 F.2d 852, 856 n.3 
(3d Cir. 1981) ("Because we conclude . . . that the district 
court's judgment should be affirmed under well-settled 
principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel, assuming 
without deciding that we have jurisdiction permits a proper 
and lawful resolution of the dispute without facing the 
damages lurking in the murky waters surrounding the state 
action question."). 
 
In this case, certainly at least as to the construction of 
section 2253(c)(2), difficult and far-reaching procedural 
questions potentially are presented. Nevertheless, as will be 
seen, we can affirm on the merits so that we will resolve the 
appeal in favor of the government, the party "to whose 
benefit [any] objection to jurisdiction would redound." In re 
DN Assocs., 3 F.3d at 515. Thus, we will decide the appeal 
on the merits. 
 
Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 623-24 (3d 
Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S.Ct. 379 (1996), is not 
inconsistent with the action we take. There we indicated 
that "[a]lthough we deem it wise not to decide most of the 
jurisdictional issues posed by this case, we are obliged to 
consider the threshold question whether we have appellate 
jurisdiction to review the propriety, under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23, of the district court's class certification." 
But Georgine is distinguishable because there we held that 
the class certification was improper. Thus, we vacated the 
district court order certifying the class, and remanded the 
case to the district court to decertify the class. Georgine, 83 
F.3d at 635. Therefore, in Georgine we could not assume 
that we had jurisdiction because we were not deciding the 
case in favor of the parties to whose benefit the objection to 
jurisdiction would redound. 
 
Of course, we add that this opinion should not be taken 
as an indication that in the future we will depart regularly 
from our usual practice of determining whether we have 
jurisdiction before reaching the merits of an appeal. To the 
contrary, ordinarily we will adhere to that practice. See 
Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524, 532-33, 96 S.Ct. 2771, 
2775-76 (1976). Here, we decide the appeal on the merits 
because, unlike resolution of the difficult questions relating 
to the construction of section 2253(c)(2), consideration of 
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this appeal on the merits yields an obvious result. 
Moreover, we can conceive of no procedural complications 
that will flow from an affirmance in this case as our order 
will terminate the section 2255 proceedings. Finally, and 
perhaps most significantly, the order from which the appeal 
has been taken is undoubtedly final and thus ordinarily 
would be appealable. Only the provisions relating to 
certificates of appealability cast doubt on our jurisdiction. 
Accordingly, we regard this appeal as presenting a special 
situation justifying our determination of the appeal on the 
merits even if questions relating to our jurisdiction are 
unsettled. 
 
There is a final group of issues we must address before 
reaching the merits of the appeal. Eyer contends that the 
AEDPA is an ex post facto law when applied to crimes, such 
as his, committed before its effective date, April 24, 1996. 
In addition, he contends that the AEDPA unconstitutionally 
restricts the writ of habeas corpus and is void for 
vagueness. At oral argument we pointed out that 
notwithstanding these contentions, the district court 
granted the certificate of appealability so that it appeared 
that Eyer's constitutional arguments would be moot if we 
held that the district court properly issued the certificate. 
Eyer agreed with this observation. In fact, even if we 
sustained Eyer's constitutional arguments, he would be 
entitled only to a determination of his appeal on the merits. 
We will make that determination and, accordingly, we need 
not consider his constitutional challenges to the AEDPA. 
 
b. The merits of the appeal 
 
Eyer argues that he is entitled to relief on the merits 
because this case was tried "based on the expansive 
definition of `use' set forth in United States v. 
Theorodopoulos, 866 F.2d 587 (3d Cir. 1989) which held 
that a firearm was `used' if it was available for possible use 
during the drug transaction." Br. at 10. Eyer contends that 
in United States v. Price, 76 F.3d 526, 528 (3d Cir. 1996), 
we recognized that Theorodopoulos did not survive Bailey. 
He also contends that the facts in this case could not 
justify a conviction under the "carry" prong of section 
924(c)(1). 
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The government answers that the Supreme Court in 
Bailey, 116 S.Ct. at 509, recognized that its opinion did not 
affect the "carry" prong of section 924(c)(1) and that a 
"number of courts of appeals have held that possessing a 
firearm in an automobile during and in relation to a drug 
trafficking crime constitutes `carrying' under" section 
924(c)(1). Br. at 35. It cites a number of cases to support its 
conclusion on the point including United States v. Pineda- 
Ortuno, 952 F.2d at 103-04, and United States v. Freisinger, 
937 F.2d at 387-88, both of which the district court cited. 
 
We are not concerned with what disposition we would 
have made if this case had been tried to a jury because the 
district court clearly convicted Eyer for carrying the firearm. 
Accordingly, Bailey is not implicated here. Furthermore, the 
facts here compel the conclusion that Eyer was carrying the 
firearm. As we explained above, the handgun was loaded 
and was in a console between the two front seats, and was 
conveyed with the cocaine to the purchaser's apartment. 
Eyer's easy access to the handgun and its transportation 
convinces us that he was carrying it. Accordingly, we have 
no occasion to address the broad question of whether it 
always can be said that a defendant is carrying a firearm if 
he or she has the firearm in a car while committing a drug 
trafficking offense. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
In view of the aforesaid, we will affirm the order of April 
11, 1996. We deny Eyer's application to us for a certificate 
of appealability as moot. 
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